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SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, 120 Nev. Adv. Op. 75 (Sep. 18, 2014)1 
 
PROPERTY LAW: HOA LIENS 
 
Summary 
 
The Court determined that (1) an HOA receives a true superpriority lien on a 
homeowner’s property under NRS 116.3116 making an HOA lien, with limited exceptions, 
“prior to all other liens and encumbrances” on the property, including first deeds of trust 
recorded before the dues became delinquent; and (2) an HOA lien can be foreclosed on 
nonjudicially. 
 
Background 
 
 In 2010, the HOA and U.S. Bank began nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings on a 
delinquent property. SFR Investments Pool 1 LLC (SFR) purchased the property from the 
HOA’s trustee’s sale in September of 2012. SFR filed an action to quiet title and enjoin US 
Bank’s trustee sale on the property that was to take place in December 2012, maintaining that the 
HOA trustee’s deed terminated U.S. Bank’s deed. The district court granted U.S. Bank’s motion 
to dismiss because the district court held an HOA must foreclose judicially. SFR appealed. 
 
Discussion 
 
A.  
 
An HOA receives its right to a lien on a homeowners’ property under NRS 116.3116(1). 
An HOA lien is elevated over all other liens by NRS 116.3116(2), except in three instances 
including when “(b) A first security interest on the unit [is] recorded before the date on which the 
assessment sought to be enforced became delinquent . . .” Thus, a first deed of trust generally has  
priority over an HOA lien. However, NRS 116.3116(2) further creates a partial exception to 
(2)(b)’s exception for first security interests. This partial exception states that “[t]he [HOA] lien 
is also prior to all security interests described in paragraph (b) to the extent of any [maintenance 
and nuisance-abatement] charges . . . and to the extent of the assessments for common expenses 
[i.e., HOA dues]” which would have been due during the nine months before an action was taken 
to enforce the lien.2 
Accordingly, a HOA lien is split into two parts by NRS 116.3116(2) – a superpriority and 
a subpriority part. The superpriority aspect of an HOA lien consists of nine months of unpaid 
dues, maintenance, and nuisance charges, which is “prior to” first deeds of trust.3 The subpriority 
aspect consists of any other fees owed to the HOA, which is secondary to first deeds of trust.4  
The Nevada Legislature adopted NRS 116.3116 largely based off of the Uniform 
Common Interest Ownership Act of 1982 (UCIOA). The purpose of adopting the UCIOA was 
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“to make uniform the law with respect to [its] subject [matter] among states enacting it.”5 
Though NRS 116.3116 largely follows the UCIOA, the Legislature created specific provisions 
(NRS 116.31162 through NRS 116.31168) governing HOA liens separate from the UCIOA. 
 Under NRS 116.31162 through NRS 116.31168, to foreclose on a property, an HOA 
must notify the owner of his or her delinquency and the HOA may record a notice of default and 
sell the property if the owner does not pay in 30 days. NRS 116.31168 differs from the UCIOA 
here because general third-party notice is not required, only specific timing and notice 
requirements are necessary. “The HOA must provide the homeowner notice of default and 
election to sell; it also must notify ‘[e]ach person who has requested notice pursuant to NRS 
107.090 or 116.31168’ and ‘[a]ny holder of a recorded security interest encumbering the unit’s 
owner’s interest who has notified the association, 30 days before the recordation of the notice of 
default, of the existence of the security interest.’”6 
 
B.  
 
 U.S. Bank argued that “NRS 116.3116(2) merely create[d] a payment priority” between a  
HOA lien and a first deed of trust. Thus the dues, maintenance, and nuisance-abatement aspect of 
an HOA lien would not become a superpriority lien until after the beneficiary of the first deed of 
trust foreclosed, and the buyer would have to pay the HOA lien to receive clear, insurable title. 
However, if the superpriority aspect of an HOA lien is a true priority lien, then the HOA lien 
would be prior to the first deed of trust and it could be foreclosed resulting in termination of a 
first deed of trust. 
 U.S Bank argues that the HOA lien must only have a “payment priority” and not a true 
priority or else NRS 116.3116 would create an unprecedented split lien where the super priority 
aspect of an HOA lien (nine months of unpaid HOA dues, maintenance, and nuisance-abetment 
charges) has priority over a first deed of trust but the remaining subpriority aspect does not. The 
court, however, demonstrates this is exactly what NRS 116.3116  was intended to do.  First, the 
statute does not contain the phrase “payment priorities” as it could have easily and instead states 
the “lien…is prior to”. Thus the text of NRS 116.3116 supports that it was intended to by a true 
priority lien.  The UCIOA also sheds light by stating that the split lien was created to balance  
enforcing collection of unpaid HOA dues and the need to protect the security interest of lenders. 
The UCIOA also states that lenders would likely pay the dues owed to the HOA rather than 
letting the HOA foreclose on the property. Yet, if the superpriority aspect of an HOA lien only 
created a payment priority, then the UCIOA addressing lenders paying off the HOA’s 
superpriority aspect of the lien to prevent foreclosure would be unnecessary.  
The superpriority aspect of NRS 116.3116(2) does not simply create a payment priority 
for delinquent payments but instead creates a true priority lein. The court then explains that the 
rationale behind is that “when a homeowner walks away from the property and the first deed of 
trust holder delays foreclosure, the HOA has to ‘either increase the assessment burden on the 
remaining unit/parcel owners or reduce the services the association’. To avoid having the 
community subsidize first security holders who delay foreclosure the superpriority lien was 
enacted.   
Lastly, even though HOA liens are generally nominal compared to first deeds of trust, the 
inequity was of U.S. Banks own making because it could have paid off the HOA lien to avert 
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loss of its security or established an escrow for HOA assessments to avoid having to use its own 
funds to pay delinquent dues. 
 
C.  
 
 NRS 116.075 allows an HOA to “foreclose its lien by sale,” which, under NRS 
116.31162(1), includes an HOA foreclosing on a property with a nonjudicial sale.7 NRS 
116.3116(1) and NRS 116.31162, taken together, allow an HOA to nonjudicially foreclose on 
the HOA’s entire lien, not only the subpriority aspect.  
 U.S. Bank maintained that the word “action” in the phrase “institution of an action to 
enforce the lien” in NRS 116.3116(2) means a civil action and a lawsuit.8 However, “action” 
does not exclude nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings because foreclosure proceedings can be 
instituted both judicially and nonjudicially.9 Should the Legislature have intended “action” to 
mean only civil action or judicial action, it would not have used the broader term “action.” 
Additionally, NRS 116.3116(2) does not make the superpriority aspect of an HOA lien 
dependent on if an action has occurred; an action is instead a way to measure the part of the lien 
that is a superpriority. The UCIOA also uses the phrase “institution of an action to enforce the 
lien” as a way to describe the superpriority lien, just like NRS 116.3116(2), and repeatedly 
references to judicial or nonjudicial foreclosures of HOA liens.10 Thus, the use of the word 
“action” in NRS 116.3116(2) does not mean only civil action, but also includes nonjudicial 
proceedings.11  
Further, the Nevada Legislature enacted NRS 116.31162 through NRS 116.31168 to 
address the aspects of the nonjudicial foreclosure process authorized by NRS 116.31162. This 
indicates the Legislature’s desire for HOA liens to have nonjudicial foreclosures. 
U.S. Bank argued that judicial foreclosure is necessary to provide notice and opportunity 
to be heard, among other safeguards. However, “this argument assumes that requiring the 
superpriority piece of an HOA lien to be judicially foreclosed will actually afford such 
protections without need of further amendment to Chapter 116, and this is far from clear.” 
Allowing foreclosure of the subpriority aspect of an HOA lien would create the same issues “for 
homeowners and junior lienholders that are cited as policy reasons for requiring judicial 
foreclosure of the superpriority” aspect of an HOA lien. The Legislature did not explicitly state 
this distinction, and thus did not intend it.  
The Legislature chooses the foreclosure methods for HOA liens, and the Legislature 
chose to allow nonjudicial foreclosure for HOA liens “subject to the special notice requirements 
and protections handcrafted by the Legislature in NRS 116.31162 through NRS 116.31168.” 
Judicial foreclosures would delay HOA funds to a common-interest community and would force 
those in the community to make up the dues deficiencies or abandon amenities and maintenance, 
thus lowering the value of their homes. It is not for the court to revise the foreclosure methods of 
NRS Chapter 116, but instead for the Legislature.  
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D.  
 
The court then rejects U.S. Bank’s further arguments that [1] the nonjudicial foreclosure 
in this case violated its due process rights and [2] that the mortgage savings clause in the CC&Rs 
subordinates the HOA's lien to the first deed of trust.  
 
1.  
 
 The court found that U.S. Bank’s argument that the statutory scheme that gives an HOA a 
superpriority lien that can be foreclosed nonjudicially offends due process is not valid by relying 
on precedent. The court then rejected U.S. Bank assertion that the  content of the notice it 
received was deficient y noting that SFR complied with all statutorily required notices under 
NRS 116.31162 through NRS 116.31168 and NRS 107.090 by incorporation, stated that the 
superpriority portion of the HOA lien was not paid prior to the foreclosure sale, and stated the 
specific lien amounts contrary to U.S. Bank’s assertion.   
 
2.  
 
 U.S. Bank further argued that the mortgage savings clause in the community the property 
was located subordinated the HOA’s superpriority lien to the first deed of trust. However, the 
application of NRS 116.3116(2) is not affected by the mortgage savings clause because 
“provisions may not be varied by agreement, and rights conferred by it may not be waived . . . 
[e]xcept as expressly provided in” Chapter 116.12 NRS 116.3116 does not expressly provide for a 
waiver of an HOA’s superpriority lien.13 Therefore, the mortgage saving clause did not 
subordinate the HOA’s lien to the first deed of trust. 
 
Conclusion 
 
An HOA has a true superpriority lien under NRS 116.3116(2) and nonjudicial 
foreclosure, permitted under Chapter 116, terminates first deeds of trust. Further, proper notices 
were sent and received in this case according to SFR’s complaint. The Court reversed the district 
court’s order of dismissal, vacated the order denying preliminary injunctive relief, and remanded 
the case for further proceedings. 
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